population are also those that have been exposed more than anyone else to fierce, toxic, healththreatening environmental pollution. 3 Given these numerous negative impacts, large multinational mining companies in South Africa, such as BHP Billiton, Anglo American, De Beers or AngloGold Ashanti, seek to actively promote the image of 'green' mining, and of being contributors to environmental governance. For example, these companies have led the discourse on sustainable mining and advertised various internal processes in place to reduce their negative environmental externalities. Yet, whereas both, the mining firms and government, claim that the regulatory requirements in South African are demanding, even 'world-class', in reality, enforcement is weak and insufficient (see Kranz and Hönke in this book) . In this chapter, we therefore explore whether there actually are contributions to environmental governance by medium and large-size mining firms in South Africa and inquire how these contributions vary in terms of the quality of the engagement. 4 We argue that three factors stand out in explaining why many mining companies engage in environmental governance (despite working in a context of weak law enforcement) and contribute at least to some extent to environmental protection beyond legal obligations: site specificity 5 , a looming shadow of hierarchy and the socialization into transnational norms reinforcing reputational concerns.Two factors stand out in explaining variation in the quality of such corporate engagement in environmental governance in South Africa, reputational concerns and local community pressure.
In our analysis, we consider large and medium-sized companies that operate in gold mining, (AngloGold Ashanti, Harmony Gold and Goldfields), in platinum mining (Anglo Platinum, Lonmin and Impala), and in coal mining, (BHP Billiton and Anglo Coal). The chapter starts with an analysis of mining companies' contributions to environmental governance in South Africa that go beyond legal compliance and discusses the quality of such contributions in this field. This is followed by a discussion of factors that explain why some companies in some areas engage in far-reaching, beyond-compliance environmental governance whereas the same companies in other areas and other companies refrain from doing so.
Contributions to environmental governance
Large mining companies in South Africa have installed various internal mechanisms to reduce negative externalities. In terms of disclosure, all major mining companies participate in the discourse on corporate social responsibility. Sustainability is the key concept they focuson. Companies entertain elaborate websites creating the image of corporate responsibility and sustainability. By 2006, many structured their reporting according to the standards of the Global Responsible Investment (GRI) guidelines as well as the principles of the South African King Report, which both include environmental protection as a criterion (see Kranz and Hönke in this book) . In an accountability ranking of the biggest 52 companies listed at the Johannesburg Stock Exchange 3 Interview with Director, Centre for Sustainability in Mining and Industry, Johannesburg, South Africa, 16.03.2007. 4 It should be emphasised that we concentrate on large-and medium-sized companies in this chapter. It is important to keep in mind, that negative externalities and lack of engagement in environmental governance is even more pronounced with regards to less visible and mostly smaller-sized mining companies, which are growing as a result of the industry's restructuring process in South Africa (Malherbe 2000) . 5 This could be understood as a particular form of asset specificity as defined in the introduction.
(JSE), five of the eight listed mining companies are among the top ten ranked companies (McNulty 2006) . 6 Anglo American and BHP Billiton range even within the top five followed by large South
African companies, such as AngloGold Ashanti, Gold Fields, Impala Platinum and Harmony (Jenkins H 2006 ) . As concerns the mentioned internal process management, most of the listed companies have also undergone ISO 14001 environmental management systems certification. 7 The mining industry has in addition engaged in sector-specific voluntary standards and initiatives on the global level.
8
Against this background, the following section will provide an account of if, where and how firms engage in environmental governance. More specifically we explore to what extent mining companies in South Africa contribute to a clean and sustainable environment and improve environmental governance in ways that extend beyond cleaning up their own negative externalities in compliance with national regulation. In addressing the mode of interaction, we ask whether they foster regulation or build capacities of state agencies in the environmental field, or whether they rather engage in public-private initiatives for environmental protection and private self-regulation within their production site.
Looking at mining firms' involvement in public regulation, we find several instances where some firms, including most large mining firms, participate in fora initiated by the South African , with the goal of encouraging member states to implement the relevant mining clauses of the Johannesburg Plan of Implementation (JPOI) (see also Kranz and Hönke in this book) . To address these issues, the South African Department of Minerals and Energy (DME) developed a targeted implementation strategy and initiated a national Intergovernmental Forum on Mining, Minerals, Metals and Sustainable Development, consisting of government departments, the mining industry, labour and nongovernmental organisations (Burger 2005: 456) . Similarly, at the national level, most larger mining firms participate in a range of consultation forums with regard to environmental legislation. In the context of the co-operative government approach promulgated in the South African constitution, the major pieces of environmental legislation feature extensive consultative procedures. Besides long established informal lobbying channels between important industries and the respective branch of government, a range of formal consultation forums therefore exists. Prominent examples are the Environmental Impact Assessments (EIAs), The ranking was conducted by the Centre for Corporate Citizenship/UNISA collaborating with the UK based NGO "Accountability" by using its accountability standards as measurement 7 This information has been drawn from the respective company websites. comprehensive stakeholder participation forums in deciding on the establishment or expansion of mining operations. In addition, the key legislation in mining, the Minerals and Petroleum Resources Development Act (MPRDA), provides for the establishment of a multi-stakeholder board which includes a number of departments, industry, labour and civil society with the task to advise the minister (DME 2002).
Participation in such consultations may be used in different ways, with the aim to prevent stricter regulation or to contribute to environmental governance. Firms' governance contributions are related to the establishment and improvement of environmental standards and their implementation with regards to mitigating environmental impacts. A positive example for this is a government-business forum focusing on air quality issues in the North-West platinum mining region. This so-called air quality forum was initiated by the Department of Environmental Affairs of the North West Province and comprises of all affected and interested parties with the goal of controlling emission targets in areas with environmental challenges due to industrial activity. Embedded in regular consultations between state authorities and companies, firms address air quality issues in the region, and establish monitoring standards as well as joint reduction measures and compliance.
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Another example is the role of some firms in drafting the mine closure act. In the consultation process with mining firms, Anglogold Ashanti suggested that its internal, relatively demanding mine closure policy could be used as a blueprint. 13 This sets a benchmark for other companies with less comprehensive mine closure provisions. According to industry representatives, consultation processes thus make the expertise of the industry available for the regulator 14 . In this regard, these latter activities not only feature a standard-setting component, but also involve some degree of capacity transfer (Kranz 2010) . It should be said, however, that consultations are of course also used by mining firms for lobbying activities that aim at the prevention of tighter environmental controls.
Concerning local and provincial government, where administrative capacities are particularly weak, South African law requires companies to align their local policies with the so-called Integrated Development Plans (IDPs) of local government. In the context of such cooperation, firms would, for example, assist local government in providing environmental services, such as waste water management or the provision of water infrastructure as well as general capacity-building around managing these tasks (Kranz 2010 ). An example for a partnership with a municipality is the arrangement between Implats and Rustenburg municipality regarding the treatment of municipal sewage at the company's treatment plant (ibid.: 182) 15 . Finally, AngloGold Ashanti claims to have adopted extensive mechanisms to engage with local administrations to improve their governance capacities and thereby serve the companies' long-term interest of having in place a capable public authority delivering public services.
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Another example for capacity building at the local level relates to the implementation of the 1998 South African Water Act. In order to obtain the right to abstract water for operating purposes, (Coetzee et al. 2006 , DME 2008 . 18 While not directly aimed at fostering regulation, the mining companies have contributed to the building of regulatory capacities of regional and local government departments with regards to monitoring environmental data collection, management, and modeling (Kranz 2010: 123-136) .
The attempt to improve energy efficiency of mining companies is an example of co-regulatory approaches. Spearheaded by the Sustainable Futures Unit of the National Business Initiative (NBI), voluntary energy efficiency targets have been transformed into a sector-specific energy efficiency accord adopted by the DME and mining companies in which both partners agreed on targets to reduce energy consumption. 19 To date, the project has culminated in 31 companies and industry associations signing a voluntary Energy Efficiency Accord with the DME to reduce their energy consumption (see also Kaan and Klapper 2012) . For organising economic and social transformation in post-apartheid South Africa more generally, the government has promoted a cooperative approach that has included consultation processes and public-private partnerships in many areas. The Mining Charter, a result of these efforts, is a 'voluntary agreement' between government and the mining industry that obliges firms to contribute to socio-economic empowerment. Companies need to prove compliance with the Charter in order to obtain licenses (see Hamann and Bezuidenhout 2007, Hamann 2008) . While some elements of voluntary contribution -such as defining particular targets -was part of the process, the process was very much top-down and hierarchical. The South African government was the driving force and used its powerful positionand thus its potential legislative and executive powers -in order to define a social role for big business in the mining industry .
Mining companies also engage in multi-stakeholder initiatives either at the transnational level, or within the local context of their operations. Many of these governance configurations have no
17
Interviews with Environmental Adviser, Chamber of Mines, Johannesburg, South Africa, 16.11.2007 ; National Business Initiative.
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We witnessed the heated debates at the Potchefstrom Imbizo, a public hearing on these issues at which critical scientists and activists as well as government and Goldfields presented their views (Potchefstrom, 06.12.2007 At the local level, a number of multi-stakeholder initiatives exist that are often part of mining companies' stakeholder management policies and address issue-specific concerns, with regard to environmental problems in a mining area. This could involve the mitigation of pollution incidents as well as joint planning to develop infrastructure for providing a common good, such as the access to water resources. As an example, the gold-mining company Harmony, which is mainly operating in the Gauteng West Rand, is liaising with both the municipality and the Randfontein Environmental Action Group, an environmental NGO, to develop broadly accepted measures to reduce fugitive dust from its slime dams around Randfontein (Harmony Gold 2006: 60) .
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Similarly, all major platinum mining companies in the Rustenburg area have such procedures in place to manage their impact on environmental resources and elicit community opinion on their behavior. At Anglo Platinum, for example, stakeholder and community interaction is managed through the Community and Environment Department (CED), which maintains contact to communities as well as key environmental stakeholders, such as the North-West Eco Forum (Kranz 2010) . Platinum-miner Implats' stakeholder engagement focuses on six 'host' communities, which are impacted by daily operations and is guided to a large extent by the needs formulated in the A substantial number of these community engagement fora work without much state involvement. Concerning private governance by individual firms and within the industry in the field of environmental protection and sustainable development, we find activities at different levels. In contrast to mining companies' engagement against HIV/AIDS in South Africa (see Hönke in this volume), the transnational arena plays a more important role compared to the national and local arenas. Being both, culprits and innovative standard setters in the area of HIV/AIDS, South African mining firms rather adopt and implement ready-made environmental policies that are institutionalised in the national environmental regulation or transnational standards (see also Szablowski 2007) .
At the international level, in 1999 nine of the largest mining companies closed ranks to form the Global Mining Initiative (GMI) presenting the industry as committed to environmental principles and standards. In preparation of the World Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg 2002, a comprehensive consultation and research program, the Mining, Metals and Sustainable Development process was started to develop state of the art of sustainability policies for the industry in the Southern African region. As a result, the International Council on Mining and Metals (ICMM) was established and mandated to develop a common global reporting standard for the industry, the Sustainable Development Framework (SDF). 30 Membership in the ICMM implies firms to integrate a set of 10 principles and seven supporting position statements into corporate policy, as well as setting up transparent and accountable reporting practices. These principles include the continual improvement of their environmental performance, the contribution to the conservation of biodiversity and integrated approaches to land use planning as well as a responsible product design, use, re-use, recycling and disposal of their products 31 . Working groups under the auspices of the ICMM on critical issues with regard to mining and sustainable development meet regularly and develop guidelines on sustainability issues which are crucial to the global agenda. As such, the Environmental Stewardship work program seeks to strengthen its members' capacity to help improve their environmental performance and "risk management", and to work effectively with governments and local communities 32 . Interviewees from the major players of the mining industry In South Africa, all larger mining companies are part of the South African Chamber of Mines, which acts as the major representative of big mining companies vis-à-vis the South African government. This national association of the mining industry has traditionally been a powerful industry body which represents about 90% of the industry (CoM Annual Report 2006). While its influence has diminished with the end of apartheid, it still serves as the main coordination body of the large mining houses. With regard to environmental policies, its environmental advisor provides background information, facilitates exchange, the development of common industry positions and guidelines on key environmental issues. There is an environmental working group consisting of technical staff of member companies, and an environmental committee at the management level.
As its largest members, Anglo American and BHP Billiton, the Chamber of Mines is a member of the ICMM. Currently, efforts are made to establish an industry-wide voluntary reporting scheme for mining firms' sustainability performance. To raise the profile of the South African industry these shall be integrated into an industry-wide CSR report issued by the Chamber of Mines.
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A more recent example for collective standard-setting initiatives is the position paper of the Chamber with regards to the 'Water for Growth and Development' strategy of DWAF, issued in March 2009 (CoM SA 2008). The policy document was developed within a consultative process among the member companies as well as the most relevant external stakeholders. Commitments are laid out for the entire industry -in this case with regards to the role of mining in water resource development -but are not binding. They are rather supposed to work through peer pressure and potential reputational damage.
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Unlike the larger mining companies, smaller and junior firms hardly engage in environmental governance. Rather, they pose environmental problems, which often also affect larger companies. Other private-private partnership initiatives can be found at the local level, such as sponsorship initiatives for NGOs and community projects. An example is AngloAmerican's sup port for a wetland conservation project. Partnering with a South African non-governmental organisation, Working for Wetlands, local people are trained in rehabilitation skills and care for off-site wetlands to compensate for those lost on site owing to mining (Anglo American 2005: 40) . In other cases, companies have sought to engage with local community groups to support the monitoring of their environmental issues at the local level, as observed in the West Rand gold mining area. As mentioned above, Gold Fields has taken a proactive approach towards addressing some of the pertinent water management issues in the Wonderfonteinspruit catchment. The company took the initiative to form the Wonderfonteinspruit Action Group (WAG), which brought together mines, regulators, scientific institutions and community representatives in order to work towards a better understanding of the pollution situation in the catchment. The initiative led to the creation of a catchment-wide monitoring system and the re-establishment of Water Management Forums for the catchment area (Kranz 2010) .
Governance for whom? Assessing the quality of environmental governance contributions by business
Overall, the large and medium-sized companies we have studied have actively contributed to environmental governance in South Africa. However, crucial questions revolve around the quality of these contributions. aspects: first, effectiveness of implementation; second, geographical and social scope of governance initiatives and contributions -we also refer to this point as the inclusiveness of governance -; and third, the indirect effects of governance attempts and how such attempts relate to the negative externalities of core business practices (Hönke and with Thomas 2012) .
In terms of scope, many environmental problems are negative environmental externalities of core business practices. Reducing such externalities contributes to a cleaner environment from which everybody could benefit. Contributions that reach beyond reducing own negative externalities benefit the broader public if companies participate in projects that improve the environment and this improvement is accessible to all (clean air, clean water, rehabilitated wetlands ecetera). Problems with the inclusiveness of governance by firms therefore seem to be less an issue in the environmental policy field than in the area of combating HIV/AIDS. However, a number of limitations need to be raised.
A first limitation concerns the problem-solving effectiveness of environmental governance by mining companies. It is difficult to distinguish 'talk-shops' and 'green-washing' from activities that effectively reduce negative environmental externalities of mining, or otherwise contribute to environmental governance. The MMSD process for instance was advertised broadly by the industry. However, critical voices have questioned whether the documents contained much new on how to render mining more sustainable. 43 And in fact the actual impact of the accumulation of knowledge that took place during the MMSD process on the environmental practices of mining firms in South Africa is difficult to trace. 44 The activities of the Mining Interest Group (MIG) 45 illustrate how much of the industry's involvement in environmental issues beyond the firm relates to outreach and the management of public opinion. Often, such fora are very much directed at showcasing the mining industry's position rather than engaging in a truly open dialogue. Therefore, this behaviour has a connotation of lobbying according to the industry's understanding (Kranz 2010 ). Similar problems relate to capacity building by companies for selected parts of the state administration. Due to the intensive interaction of company officials with government representatives, such activities in some cases straddle the line of agency capture or co-option. Examples are the speeding-up of the process leading up to water licenses (see previous section), but also other involvement with the regulatory process, which are bound to result in advantages for corporate actor due to the controlling influence exerted in the first place. The extent to which voluntary environmental standards actually lead to changing practices at local mining sites of companies is also not always clear.
A second limitation refers to the scope and thus the inclusiveness of contributions to environmental governance by medium and large-sized mining firms. A first aspect in this regard relates to membership in environmental governance initiatives. Awareness of sustainability issues and engagement in environmental governance differ between companies. Only some mining companies comply with national law and international standards and engage in addition beyond compliance in environmental governance. While large global companies take the lead in rankings such as the Whitemore (2006) .
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This situation might change as one of the organisers of the process has started a review of the MMSD achievements in 2012, see http://www.iied.org/minings-search-for-sustainability-how-far-have-we-come (last accessed 15 August 2012).
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The MIG is a voluntary association of mining firms operating the in the Witwatersrand area to discuss key environmental issues involving the entire industries.
Social Responsibility Index of the JSE, medium-sized companies of South African origin are 'followers' at best, and smaller enterprises are not participating in the discourse at all. 46 While the latter are not the focus of this chapter on multinational mining companies, it should be mentioned that many of the smaller mining enterprises engage less in environmental protection. Compared to the larger mining companies, they are much less visible -also because they have not such a problematic historical legacy as building blocks of the apartheid system -and follow a more riskfriendly business strategy. Yet, also when comparing medium-sized companies with large global players, contributions to environmental governance by the former beyond what is required are rather limited (Szablowski 2007: 79 Another aspect in regard to the quality of governance contributions is that large mining companies focus on environmental management within the company, which is important and the basic responsibility of firms. Yet, these activities remain limited to reducing negative externalities caused by the very same company. They thus might prevent more degradation of the environment but do not make a genuinely positive, additional contribution to a better environment. Only the latter would go beyond a cleaning up of companies' own act. A second aspect refers to the relationship between addressees of such contributions and those affected by the core business activities of mining firms. Mining firms sometimes engage in conservation activities far away from mining sites, such as the wetland project sponsored by Anglo American mentioned above. Such sponsorship can be regarded as contributing to better environmental quality in South Africa. However, while useful for constructing a green image of the firm, it does not reduce the environmental pollution, and the negative impact on affected communities, caused by that very same company as these contributions are unrelated to the company's core business practices.
Understanding contributions to environmental protection by mining companies
In particular in comparison with other sectors, most large mining companies engagesubstantially in environmental governance. The mining industry stands out with respect to the significant number of collectively shared standards and initiatives in the environmental field. However, these efforts are very much related to the substantial negative environmental impact of the industry and a substantial part of these activities revolves around attempts to reduce at least some of these negative externalities. Whereas Llarge and medium-sized companies engage to some extent in environmental governance, we find variation in the quality of contributions to a better environment Three factors stand out in order to understand why most medium-and large-sized mining companies engage at least in some sort of environmental governance in South Africa. specificity characterizes all investment in the core segment of industrial mining, the exploitation and processing of minerals. Mining companies are bound to invest in those countries and places that dispose of rich mineral deposits. Once they invest in a place, these companies are confronted with substantial sunk costs; that is with substantial initial investments for which there are very long cycles of returns (Auty 2006; Snyder 2006) . 48 In addition, they are to a high degree dependent on a secure operating environment as well as functioning public infrastructure. For both reasons, the exit option for industrial mining firms is low. This particular characteristic of multinational firms in this sector explains the extent to which these firms try to respond to public pressure and engage with state actors in order to influence public policy and its implementation.
Second, an important context factor that accounts for why mining companies engage more in environmental governance than, for instance, textile companies (see Müller-Debus in this volume) revolves around the threat of hierarchical regulation. Mining companies are confronted more with an external shadow of hierarchy than firms from other sectors as, on the one hand, international organizations and home states of companies have repeatedly considered, and partly already introduced, binding regulation for the activities of multinational companies abroad (external shadow of hierarchy). In South Africa, in addition, the mining industry is confronted with the looming threat of stricter enforcement of the law (shadow of hierarchy cast by the state) more than other sectors analyzed in this book. This shadow is more relevant for mining companies because they depend on the specific sites where minerals can be exploited. In particular since the 1990s, activists make the extensive environmental pollution caused by extractive industries a subject of public debates and push for stricter regulation and implementation of environmental law.
Examples for external threats of regulation are sector-specific programs issued by transnational organizations, such as the IFC, by national governments (e.g. Canada and Australia), regulation in export markets, or other international environmental policy regimes, such as expected climate protection requirements in the context of a potential follow-up to the Kyoto Protocol. Such external shadows of hierarchy affects firm behaviour in South Africa in various ways: compliance with the IFC guidelines, for example, is a prerequisite for accessing financial support by the IFC. Furthermore, multinational firms might be required to abide with certain environmental standards by their home country irrespective of the regulation in their respective host country. The global debate on climate protection offers insights into mechanisms of how international environmental regimes, which are in the first place only binding for states, might also become relevant for firms. The 2011 meeting of the Conference of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol, which was held in Durban South Africa, raised the attention for climate change issues among many South Africa-based firms and also spurred expectations for stricter regulation in that field by the South African government in the near future. While concrete legislation has not yet been put in place, the expectation alone has led to considerable debates and activities on the part of companies. A good example for the anticipation of coming regulation by firms is the voluntary energy-efficiency accord of the DME with private actors. Iis motivated by energy constraints as well as possible upcoming regulation of South Africa under the Kyoto protocol in the post 2012-phase. 51 Firms are faced with potential energy cuts as well as fines for greenhouse gas emissions, as well as the introduction of an emission trading scheme. MNCs with experience in emission trading schemes and energy-efficiency policies anticipate similar regulation in South Africa and thus follow an early mover approach in this policy field (Kahn and Klapper forthcoming) . These examples show that the threat of regulation casts a shadow of hierarchy over mining firms which they anticipate by engaging in environmental governance.
The anticipation of new legislation also resonates with the level of existing environmental legislation for the mining sector in South Africa, which is comprehensive and targets many aspects of mineral exploitation and processing. Mining companies are regulated by several ministries, with the Department of Mineral Resources 52 taking the lead. As pointed out before (see Kranz and Hönke in this volume), implementation is haunted with difficulties for various reasons, such as regulatory fragmentation and a lack of enforcement capacity. In the mining sector in particular, the Minerals Department is an ambivalent institution as it is supposed to encourage mining development in South Africa, yet also claims to lead environmental regulation of the same sector. The much weaker Department of Environmental Affairs has been struggling to build capacities in order to enforce environmental standard independently. 53 However, companies face risks by not being legally compliant as ad hoc controls or requirements may come from any of the departments concerned with environmental issues (e.g. water) related to mining. And the political opposition has pushed for separating the economic promotion and environmental regulation of mining firms, which keeps a threat of stricter regulation looming.
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While this might change the way mining companies interact with government departments in the future, the relevance of regulation in making mining companies engage in environmental governance becomes quite evident in the gold mining areas of the Witwatersrand. In this area, which is stricken by massive, historic and present day mining impacts on water and land resources, responsibilities for distinct impacts are often hard to assign and compliance is extremely difficult to monitor. Without the continued intervention of the regulator (in this case regional water directorates) companies would not properly address the pressing issue of acid mine drainage. This holds true for companies across the board. In cases where the authorities lack the capacity or resources to effectively monitor company behavior, companies choose not to become active in mitigating negative impacts of acid mine drainage (Kranz, 2010) .
Third, environmental governance contributions by larger mining firms are driven by the diffusion of transnational norms and standards of environmental protection. Yet only certain companies have been socialized into these standards and have adopted them due to reputational concerns. Reputational concerns thus explain to an important extent variation we find in the quality of mining firms' contributions to environmental governance in South Africa. Environmental regulation has been a crucial topic of global governance, and has been at the core of the global corporate responsibility movement. International standards have become relevant for corporate behavior in South Africa through both, changes in the market environment that made certain firms streamline environmental standards from the headquarters across mining operations in different countries, and the adoption of demanding environmental standards by the South African government providing incentives for companies to engage in environmental protection.
International financial markets provide important incentives for applying high environmental standards in countries with limited capacities to enforce environmental laws, such as South Africa (King and Lenox 2001) . Multinational mining companies operating in South Africa are largely dependent on capital flows from those sources and are therefore directly influenced by investors' evaluation of their company performance. Especially if listed at stock exchanges outside South Africa, mining companies are subject to extensive reporting requirements as regards their social and environmental performance . 55 Shareholder activism is becoming a widespread phenomenon at the world's most important stock exchanges in New York and London. In addition, the Johannesburg Stock Exchange features its own Social Responsibility Index (SRI) (see Kranz and Hönke in this volume) . Especially larger firms with a brand name, such as AngloAmerican and De Beers, are subject to an intensive screening process. Yet also for less visible large and medium-sized companies, positive performance on the JSE SRI is increasingly important for signalling trustworthiness to investors.
Especially more visible brands engage in environmental governance out of reputational concerns, and often in reaction to public pressure. These two factors also largely explain variation in the quality of engagement. Mining companies in South Africa have been 'shamed into' (better) contributions to environmental governance by NGO campaigns that targeted companies' reputation. There is a particularly high number of transnational campaigns against extractive industries, such as by Friends of the Earth, Human Rights Watch or the Publish What You Pay network in Africa. 56 Such transnational shaming mechanisms are more threatening for a company if they are complemented or enhanced by local activism and critique. Post-apartheid South Africa has a lively and outspoken environmental NGO-scene. South African activists have employed different strategies, such as lobbying, campaigning, capacity-building and increasingly litigation to point to corporate malpractice. 57 The Federation for a Sustainable Environment is, for instance, involved in a number of 55 These requirements are increasingly tightened at the JSE as well.
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The environmental pollution of the Niger Delta through oil installations and pipelines of Shell and Chevron, which traverse the entire region with oil spills that occur on a regular basis and contaminate soil and water, has raised one of the best-known transnational campaigns denouncing environmental pollution in areas of limited statehood.
57 Van Eeden, E. (2008) . "Weaknesses in Environmental Action in South Africa: A Historical Glance on the West Rand (Gauteng)." Water Resources Development 24(3): 463 -475. Van Eeden, E. (2008) . An Historical Assessment of NGO lobbying and whistle-blowing efforts in the Gauteng gold mining area (Eeden 2008) . Environmental groups have also joined efforts with other civil society groups such as trade union branches and community-based organisations (Lund-Thomson 2005) . Overall, South African NGOs as well as local communities have been very active, and more openly outspoken than in the apartheid past, which puts pressure on companies and government to contribute to the collective good (e.g. Atkinson 2007, Ballard and Habib 2006) . Often, South African NGOs are also well-connected with a transnational network of NGOs, critically monitoring activities of mining firms.
Making local struggles visible and linking them to global public and transnational campaigns has made local community protest more effective. These processes in fact turned localised protests into a major risk factor for mining companies in areas of limited statehood (Hönke forthcoming). The activities of the Federation for a Sustainable Environment, a South Africa-based NGO, provide an example in this respect. The federation is lobbying against gold mining-related water pollution and is not only very vocal in South Africa, but has managed to also bring issues such as acid mine drainage to the attention of international news media. 58 Mining companies in South Africa have sought to pacify these critics through the adoption of high self-regulatory standards and an ostensive commitment to social responsibilities. Amongst the companies operating in South Africa, large global companies such as BHP Billiton and Anglo American, and companies that were targeted by a human rights campaign, such as AngloGold Ashanti, have thus often taken the lead in the Social Responsibility Index of the Johannesburg Stock Exchange.
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There is therefore variation between firms with and without brand names, or in other words, between more and less visible mining firms. Many of the smaller and some of the medium-sized mining companies are considerably less exposed to corporate shaming campaigns. These companies are 'followers' at best, or do not engage much in extensive environmental governance. One might argue that these companies engage less in environmental governance because it is too costly and beyond their means (e.g. Malherbe 2000) . However, size as such does not fully explain these differences in behavior. The case of AngloGold Ashanti is illustrative in this regard as it shows how reputational concerns -in reaction to shaming campaigns -make a difference. The mediumsized gold mining company has become a leader in engaging in human rights and security-related CSR. 60 This can be traced back to campaigns against the firm in the past, the most famous one against irresponsible security practices in Eastern Congo. AngloGold Ashanti was accused of complicity with the Nationalist and Integrationist Front (FNI), a rebel group that used to control the region in which AGA holds its Mongbwalu concession in Ituri. The case became central to international NGO campaigns urging regulation against companies fuelling conflict (HRW 2005). In the aftermath of such serious criticism, the company reconsidered its approach to corporate social responsibility, including environmental governance. Other medium-sized companies that have not been the target of such criticism, such as Harmony Gold and Goldfields, do not engage in environmental governance as much. 61 This example shows that public pressure on companies with reputational concerns can lead to more environmental governance by mining firms. Smaller companies are even less visible and therefore populate the more risk-friendly business segment of the mining industry (Szablowski 2007: 79; Malherbe 2000) . They therefore often do not engage in environmental governance beyond what is absolutely required and enforced by the state.
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Our evidence from South Africa highlights different ways in which public pressure can materialize and how it affects corporate environmental governance. Above we have provided evidence for the reputational concerns-argument, as outlined in the introduction to this book: pressure can be exercised through shaming campaigns, which target corporate reputation. Yet, public pressure against mining companies is also often expressed as local community protest. Such protest does not always work through the mechanism of reputation. Instead, protest action such as blockades and sabotage may impose direct operational costs on the company -through damage, interruption of operations, and through law suits (Hönke forthcoming, 2012a; Frynas 2004) . Local contestation can incite more environmental governance by mining firms due to the `site-specificity' of mining operations as walking away from the costs such protest imposes is an unlikely choice. Mining firms will rather address community protest that disrupts operations than leave for less troublesome investment environments (Hönke 2012 ).
These two mechanisms of how community pressure may operate -through reputational concerns or through physical threat and the imposition of direct costs -are not always easy to distinguish, and are often interrelated. Both mechanisms explain how pressure from local communities makes a difference in how much mining firms engage in environmental governance. The important point of the argument here is that community pressure can also affect the environmental practices of firms that do not have a brand name and that are thus not vulnerable to reputational concerns. Community pressure has worked for instance in the case of the medium-sized and not widely known gold-mining company Harmony in the Randfontein area. After community protest against problems with the fugitive dust caused by the company, Harmony liaised with both the municipality and the Randfontein Environmental Action Group and developed measures to reduce the dust in order to avoid (Harmony Gold 2006:60 Platinum, but also tried to impose direct costs on the companies by blocking roads, this community protest remained little effective in changing corporate behaviour. Further research into the concrete political context is needed to understand this ineffectiveness of mobilisation.
Finally, the mining sector is outstanding in the way that public pressure -in relation with reputational concerns -not only affects the quality of environmental governance contributions by individual mining firms targeted by campaigns but by the sector as a whole. Reputation in the mining industry is considered by brand name firms, and thus most larger firms, not as companyspecific but as a collective issue (Szablowski 2007 . Especially those companies that are much exposed to public pressure describe reputation as a collective issue pertaining to the entire industry. Anglo American Group, Goldfields or BHP report that they would often get blamed for pollution in areas in which they operate, or used to operate, even though such pollution was caused by other companies. 65 While smaller companies can free-ride on the positive image produced by CSR-activities of larger companies, all companies in the sector suffer reputation damages when any mining company is criticized (Hönke et al. 2008 Nevertheless, there are haphazard efforts to integrate smaller firms in environmental governance initiatives of larger companies as well as multi-stakeholder dialogues. 68 The degree to which this is taking place is dependent on how closely different operations are located to each other. In the coal mining areas companies are "basically at each other's doorsteps" and negative impacts of individual firms are difficult to assign to the respective polluter. In the case of the Loeskop dam in the Mpumalanga Highveld, Crissismere area, BHP was accused that it polluted and unjustified stepped into a protected area. However, according to the company, the damage was done by smaller mining companies that operated in the vicinity. 69 It is also difficult to getting smaller companies to the table as they have little incentive to invest in costly environmental regulation because of a lack of financial resources and human capacities. Therefore, a representative of a major mining firm said that he was happy about the increasing community pressure mining firms have to deal with in South Africa. 70 Also smaller companies are obliged by law to consult with neighbouring communities and contribute to the IDPs of local municipalities. Even where these requirements are not closely monitored and enforced by the state, communities have become more sensitive to environmental issues and more conscious of their rights, and according to the environmental manager of xxx now also put pressure on smaller companies to contribute to environmental governance.
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Conclusion
This chapter has shown that most large and medium-sized mining companies in South Africa engage extensively in environmental governance. However, much of this engagement is concerned with internalizing at least some of the substantial negative imprint the industry has on the environment. Concerning these contributions we have found little evidence that companies foster environmental state regulation; this is related to the fact that -as opposed to HIV/AIDS -most international standards are part of environmental legislation in South Africa. Business is rather faced with an implementation gap of this regulation. Contributions to better governance by government therefore relate to capacity building at this stage of the policy cycle. With regard to co-regulation, we found most governance contributions in the environmental field in multi-stakeholder initiatives at the transnational and local level. The mining industry stands out in that sector-wide environmental governance initiatives and business associations play an important role. We have pointed to three limitations in the quality of contributions to environmental governance by mining firms: a lack of inclusiveness of membership in voluntary mechanisms, second the limited effectiveness of environmental governance attempts, and third, limitations in the scope of such contributions in particular in comparison to the huge negative externalities of the industry.
externalities, the diffusion of transnational norms, and standards of environmental regulation in the extractive industries to South Africa, as well as to a looming shadow of hierarchy. Compared to the other sectors analyzed in this book, the mining industry stands out in that it faces a stronger threat of potential regulation and sanctions (shadow of hierarchy) at both the national and the global level.
As for national regulation, this is closely linked to the argument of site-specificity as mining firms depend to some extent on the mineral deposits they already exploit. This is not only for geological reasons. Mining companies do not easily leave operations because of high sunk costs and long return-to-investment cycles (asset specificity).
Facilitated by this is also the crucial differentiating factor that explains variation in the quality of larger mining companies' contributions to environmental governance. Medium-and large-sized mining companies engage in more effective and inclusive environmental governance the more public pressure they face. Such pressure is exercised through national and transnational shaming campaigns, which target corporate reputation, and through local community protest that, in addition to reputation, imposes costs on the company through interruption of operations and damage. The mining industry is outstanding in this regard as such public pressure is perceived by some of the larger companies in the sector as not only affecting individual mining firms but as affecting collective reputation.
Mining will never become an unproblematic industry from an environmental perspective. At the same time, economic growth and thus development through investment in mining activity often remains an imperative for many newly industrialising and developing countries, such as South Africa. This antagonism boils down to the question of how these two dimensions will be managed and balanced in future. In this endeavour, the contribution of mining companies to environmental governance needs to be judged against two other factors. The young, albeit quite comprehensive environmental regulation in South Africa, as well as the overall legacy of mining in the country, which in some cases amounts to more than 100 years. Mining companies often only inadequately deal with mine closure and retroactive responsibilities for environmental impacts incurred in the past, as for example in the case of the Witwatersrand gold mines, and thus effectively carry over mismanagement conducted in the past to future generations.
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